This paper is a continuation of Arai's paper on derivability conditions for Rosser provability predicates. We investigate the limitations of the second incompleteness theorem by constructing three different Rosser provability predicates satisfying several derivability conditions.
Introduction
Gödel's second incompleteness theorem states that if T is a recursively axiomatized consistent extension of Peano Arithmetic PA, then T cannot prove the consistency of T . This statement of the theorem is somewhat ambiguous, and it should be stated more precisely. In 1939, the first detailed proof of the second incompleteness theorem appeared in their book [8] by Hilbert and Bernays. They introduced the following conditions HB1, HB2 and HB3 which are called the Hilbert-Bernays derivability conditions, and essentially proved that if T is as above and a Σ 1 provability predicate Pr T (x) of T satisfies the Hilbert-Bernays derivability conditions, then the consistency statement ∀x(Pr T (x) → ¬Pr T (¬x)) of T cannot be proved in T .
HB1 : If T ⊢ ϕ → ψ, then PA ⊢ Pr T ( ϕ ) → Pr T ( ψ ) for any formulas ϕ, ψ.
HB2 : PA ⊢ Pr T ( ¬ϕ(x) ) → Pr T ( ¬ϕ(ẋ) ) for any formula ¬ϕ(x).
HB3 : PA ⊢ f (x) = 0 → Pr T ( f (ẋ) = 0 ) for any primitive recursive term f (x).
Moreover, Hilbert and Bernays proved that Gödel's provability predicate Pr T (x) satisfies these conditions. In 1955, Löb [18] introduced the following conditions D1, D2 and D3 which are called the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions, and proved that if Pr T (x) satisfies these conditions, then Löb's theorem holds.
D1 : If T ⊢ ϕ, then PA ⊢ Pr T ( ϕ ) for any formula ϕ.
D2 : PA ⊢ Pr T ( ϕ → ψ ) → (Pr T ( ϕ ) → Pr T ( ψ )) for any formulas ϕ, ψ.
D3 : PA ⊢ Pr T ( ϕ ) → Pr T ( Pr T ( ϕ ) ) for any formula ϕ.
Löb's theorem is known as a generalization of the second incompleteness theorem. Hence we obtain that if Pr T (x) satisfies the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions, then T cannot prove the consistency statement ¬Pr T ( 0 = 0 ) of T . This seems to be the most well-known form of the second incompleteness theorem stated accurately.
Other sets of derivability conditions which are sufficient for the second incompleteness theorem have been proposed by Jeroslow [10] , Montagna [19] and Buchholz [3] (see also [15] ). On the other hand, the second incompleteness theorem does not hold for some provability predicates. Feferman [4] found a Π 1 formula τ (v) representing the set of all axioms of T in PA such that the consistency statement ∀x(Pr τ (x) → ¬Pr τ (¬x)) is provable in PA where Pr τ (x) is the provability predicate of T constructed from τ (v). Notice that Feferman's predicate satisfies D1 and D2, but does not satisfy D3 because it is not Σ 1 .
An example of a Σ 1 provability predicate for which the second incompleteness theorem does not hold was given by Mostowski [20] . Let Pr M T (x) be the Σ 1 formula ∃y(Prf T (x, y) ∧ ¬Prf T ( 0 = 0 , y)) where Prf T (x, y) is a ∆ 1 (PA) formula saying that "y is a proof of x". Then ¬Pr M T ( 0 = 0 ) is trivially provable in PA. Since the formula Pr M T (x) satisfies D1 and D3, it does not satisfy D2. Mostowski's example shows that for Σ 1 provability predicates Pr T (x), {D1, D3} is not sufficient for the unprovability of ¬Pr T ( 0 = 0 ).
Rosser provability predicates were introduced by Rosser [22] to improve Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, and they are also examples of Σ 1 provability predicates for which the second incompleteness theorem does not hold ( [12, 13] ). That is, PA ⊢ ¬Pr R T ( 0 = 0 ) for any Rosser provability predicate Pr R T (x) of T . It follows that each Rosser provability predicate does not satisfy at least one of D2 and D3. It is known that whether each Rosser provability predicate satisfies D2 (and D3) or not dependents on the choice of a Rosser predicate. Indeed, by using Kripke theoretic method by Guaspari and Solovay [6] , we obtain a Rosser provability predicate satisfying neither D2 nor D3. Also Bernardi and Montagna [2] and Arai [1] proved the existence of Rosser predicates satisfying D2, and Arai proved the the existence of Rosser predicates satisfying D3.
Moreover, it can be shown that the consistency statement ∀x(Pr R T (x) → ¬Pr R T (¬x)) is provable for each Arai's Rosser provability predicate Pr R T (x). Then Arai's results indicate that for Σ 1 provability predicates Pr T (x), each of {D1, D2} and {D1, D3} is not sufficient for the unprovability of ∀x(Pr R T (x) → ¬Pr R T (¬x)). Also these existence results show that {D1, D2} and {D1, D3} do not imply D3 and D2, respectively.
The constructions of Rosser provability predicates are somewhat flexible, and thus actually, Rosser provability predicates satisfying several derivability conditions have also been investigated ( [11, 17, 16] ). In this paper, we construct three Rosser provability predicates satisfying several additional derivability conditions. As a consequence of these constructions, we obtain that some sets of conditions of provability predicates are not sufficient for some versions of the second incompleteness theorem. In particular, our second and third Rosser provability predicates satisfy the Hilbert-Bernays derivability conditions. Therefore in contrast to the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions, the Hilbert-Bernays derivability condition does not imply the unprovability of the consistency statement ¬Pr T ( 0 = 0 ) in general.
In Section 2, we introduce versions of derivability conditions, and also introduce some basic results from the paper [15] concerning derivability conditions. In Section 3, we introduce Rosser provability predicates, and describe background of the present paper. In the last section, we give constructions of our Rosser provability predicates.
Provability predicates and derivability conditions
Throughout this paper, T denotes a recursively axiomatized consistent extension of Peano arithmetic PA in the language of first-order arithmetic L A . The numeral for each natural number n is denoted by n. We fix some natural Gödel numbering, and let ϕ be the numeral for the Gödel number of a formula ϕ. Let {ξ k } k∈ω be some fixed effective sequence of all L A -formulas such that if ξ k is a subformula of ξ l , then k ≤ l. Notice that the sequence {ξ k } k∈ω is reputation-free. We say a Σ 1 formula Pr T (x) is a provability predicate of T if it weakly represents the set of all theorems of T in PA, that is, for any natural number n, PA ⊢ Pr T (n) if and only if n is the Gödel number of some theorem of T . Provability predicates are expected to satisfy some natural conditions which are called derivability conditions. We introduce three versions of derivability conditions, that is, local version, uniform version and global version. See [15] for further details. In the following definitions, let Γ be either ∆ 0 or Σ 1 .
Definition 2.1 (Local derivability conditions).
ΓC : PA ⊢ ϕ → Pr T ( ϕ ) for any Γ sentence ϕ. 
D3 U : PA ⊢ ∀ x(Pr T ( ϕ( ẋ) ) → Pr T ( Pr T ( ϕ( ẋ) ) )) for any formula ϕ( x).
CB : PA ⊢ Pr T ( ∀ xϕ( x) ) → ∀ xPr T ( ϕ( ẋ) ) for any formula ϕ( x).
Definition 2.3 (Global derivability conditions).
D2 G : PA ⊢ ∀x∀y(Pr T (x→y) → (Pr T (x) → Pr T (y))).
.
Here ϕ( ẋ) is an abbreviation for ϕ(x 0 , . . . , x k−1 ) which is a primitive recursive term corresponding to a primitive recursive function calculating the Gödel number of ϕ(n 0 , . . . , n k−1 ) from n 0 , . . . , n k−1 . Also x→y is a primitive recursive term such that PA ⊢ ϕ → ψ = ϕ → ψ for any formulas ϕ and ψ. Furthermore True Γ (x) is a natural formula defining the truth of Γ sentences (cf. Hájek and Pudlák [7] ).
Notice that every provability predicate automatically satisfies D1. Since our provability predicates are Σ 1 , D3 is a particular case of Σ 1 C. Also D3 U and D3 G are particular cases of Σ 1 C U . The condition CB claims the provability of sentences corresponding to the Converse Barcan Formula (see [9] ). It is easy to prove the following implications (see [15] ).
5. D1 and CB ⇒ D1 U .
6. B U 2 ⇒ CB. Moreover, the following nontrivial implication holds. Theorem 2.5 (Kurahashi [15] ). D1 and B U 2 ⇒ Σ 1 C U . By Proposition 2.4.4, we immediately obtain the following corollary which is due to Buchholz (see also [21] ).
We introduce two different consistency statements based on the provability predicate Pr T (x). Definition 2.7.
• Con 0
PrT :≡ ∀x(Pr T (x) → ¬Pr T (¬x)).
• Con 1 PrT :≡ ¬Pr T ( 0 = 0 ). Here¬x is a primitive recursive term satisfying PA ⊢¬ ϕ = ¬ϕ for any formula ϕ. Since Pr T (x) satisfies D1, Con 1 PrT implies Con 0 PrT . In general, the converse implication does not hold.
Hilbert and Bernays introduced conditions HB1, HB2 and HB3 described in the introduction which are sufficient for unprovability of Con 0
PrT . In our context, each of their conditions correponds to B 2 , CB and ∆ 0 C U , respectively. Then we call the conditions B 2 , CB and ∆ 0 C U the Hilbert-Bernays derivability conditions. Their result can be stated as follows (see [15] ).
Theorem 2.8 (Hilbert and Bernays [8] ). If Pr T (x) satisfies B 2 , CB and ∆ 0 C U , then T Con 0
PrT . The following theorem is a well-known form of unprovability of consistency which is essentially due to Löb. The conditions D1, D2 and D3 are called the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions. Theorem 2.9 (Löb [18] ). If Pr T (x) satisfies D1, D2 and D3, then T Con 1
PrT .
If we weaken the assumption in the statement of Theorem 2.9, we have another version of the result on unprovability of consistency.
Theorem 2.10 (Kurahashi [15] ). If Pr T (x) satisfies D1, B 2 and D3, then T Con 0
PrT . In his proof of the incompleteness theorems, Gödel constructed a ∆ 1 (PA) formula Proof T (x, y) saying that y is the Gödel number of a T -proof of a formula with the Gödel number x. Gödel's provability predicate Prov T (x) is defined as ∃yProof T (x, y). Then the formula Prov T (x) is a Σ 1 provability predicate satisfying full derivability conditions D1 U , D2 G and Σ 1 C G . Thus the sentence Con 1
ProvT is not provable in T by Theorem 2.9. This is Gödel's second incompleteness theorem. It is known that Con 0 ProvT and Con 1 ProvT are provably equivalent in PA (see [15] ), and so let Con T denote one of these consistency statements.
Theorem 2.11 (The second incompleteness theorem (Gödel [5] )). The consistency statement Con T of T cannot be proved in T .
Rosser provability predicates
In this section, we introduce Rosser provability predicates and survey on derivability conditions for Rosser provability predicates. We say a formula Prf T (x, y) is a proof predicate of T if it satisfies the following conditions:
3. for any natural number n and formula ϕ,
The last clause means that our proof predicates are single-conclusion ones. For each proof predicate Prf T (x, y) of T , we can associate the Σ 1 formula
which is said to be the Rosser provability predicate of Prf T (x, y) or a Rosser provability predicate of T . Notice that every Rosser provability predicate of T is a Σ 1 provability predicate of T .
Rosser provability predicates were essentially introduced by Rosser [22] to improve Gödel's first incompleteness theorem. The following proposition is an important feature of Rosser provability predicates. Since T proves ¬0 = 0, PA ⊢ ¬Pr R T ( 0 = 0 ) by Proposition 3.1. Thus we obtain the following proposition. There are limitations of the existence of Rosser provability predicates satisfying certain derivability conditions. From Theorem 2.9 and Proposition 3.2, we obtain the following corollary. The following proposition is implicitly stated in Jeroslow [10] without a proof.
Proposition 3.4. There exists no Rosser provability predicate of T satisfying
Proof. Let Pr R T (x) be the Rosser provability predicate of a proof predicate Prf T (x, y). Let σ be a Σ 1 sentence satisfying the following equivalence: Kreisel and Takeuti [14] asked whether Rosser provability predicates satisfy D2 or not. Guaspari and Solovay established a modal logical method of obtaining Rosser provabilty predicates without some certain conditions. From their method, we have: Theorem 3.6 (Guaspari and Solovay [6] ). There exist Rosser provability predicates satisfying neither D2 nor D3.
Notice that Guaspari and Solovay's Rosser provability predicates are based on multi-conclusion proof predicates, and Shavrukov [23] proved the same result for Rosser provability predicates based on single-conclusion proof predicates.
The Rosser provability predicate of Gödel's proof predicate Proof T (x, y) is denoted by Prov R T (x). Montagna [19] proved that the global version of D2 does not hold for Prov R T (x).
Proposition 3.7 (Montagna [19] ). The Rosser provability predicate Prov R T (x) does not satisfy D2 G .
On the other hand, there are Rosser provability predicates satisfying some derivability conditions. Theorem 3.8 (Bernardi and Montagna [2] ; Arai [1] ). There exist Rosser provability predicates satisfying D2 G .
The existence of Rosser provability predicates satisfying D2 was also mentioned in Shavrukov [23] . Kikuchi and Kurahashi [11] investigated Rosser provability predicates satisfying D2 and an additional certain condition. Kurahashi [16] investigated provability logics of Rosser provability predicates satisfying D2.
The existence of Rosser provability predicates satisfying D3 was proved by Arai. 2. {D1, D3 G } does not imply none of B 2 , Σ 1 C and T Con 0 PrT . In this paper, we improve Theorems 3.8 and 3.9 by showing the existence of Rosser provability predicates satisfying more additional conditions. As a corollary to our results, we obtain several more non-implications.
Main Theorems
In this section, we prove three theorems which are main theorems of this paper. The first theorem is an improvement of Theorem 3.8. . That is, there exists a Rosser provability predicate Pr R 1 (x) of T satisfying the following conditions:
). The second theorem shows that in the statement of Corollary 2.6, the condition D2 U cannot be replaced by D2. Theorem 4.2. There exists a Rosser provability predicate of T satisfying CB, D2 and ∆ 0 C G . That is, there exists a Rosser provability predicate Pr R 2 (x) of T satisfying the following conditions:
for any formulas ϕ and ψ.
PA ⊢ ∀x(True
The last theorem is an improvement of Theorem 3.9.
Theorem 4.3. There exists a Rosser provability predicate of T satisfying CB, B 2 , D3 G and ∆ 0 C G . That is, there exists a Rosser provability predicate Pr R 3 (x) of T satisfying the following conditions:
for any formula ϕ( x).
For any formulas ϕ and
. As a consequence of these theorems, we obtain the following corollary. Before proving our results, we introduce some terminology and prove a lemma. We assume that our logical symbols are only ∧, ¬ and ∀, and other logical symbols such as → and ∃ are introduced as abbreviations. We say a formula ϕ ′ is an instance of a formula ϕ if for some numbers k, i 0 , . . . , i k−1 , some variables x 0 , . . . , x k−1 and some formula ψ, the formulas ϕ and ϕ ′ are of the forms ∀x 0 · · · ∀x k−1 ψ(x 0 , . . . , x k−1 ) and ψ(i 0 , . . . , i k−1 ), respectively. For each natural number m, let F m be the set of all formulas whose Gödel numbers are less than or equal to m. We say that a finite mapping V : The above terminology and definitions are formalizable in PA. Then we can define a ∆ 1 (PA) formula Sat(u) saying that "there exists a model of P T,u satisfying the conditions (A) and (B)" by using the ∆ 1 (PA) formula True ∆0 (x). Notice that PA ⊢ Sat(m) for all natural numbers m. We prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.6. PA ⊢ Con T ↔ ∀uSat(u).
Proof. We reason in PA.
(←): Suppose ¬Con T , then there exists a number m such that P T,m contains both 0 = 0 and 0 = 0. Obviously P T,m has no model. Therefore ¬Sat(m) holds for some m.
(→): Suppose Con T . Then there is a definable complete consistent extension T ′ of T by the arithmetized completeness theorem (cf. Hájek and Pudlák [7] ). Let m be any number. We define a finite mapping V : F m → {0, 1} as follows: for every ϕ ∈ F m , V (ϕ) = 1 if and only if ϕ ∈ T ′ . Since T ′ is complete and consistent, V is a truth assignment on F m .
We prove that V satisfies the condition (A). Let ϕ and ϕ ′ be any formulas in F m with V (ϕ) = 1 and ϕ ′ is an instance of ϕ. Then ϕ ∈ T ′ . Since ϕ → ϕ ′ is logically valid, ϕ ′ ∈ T ′ . Therefore V (ϕ ′ ) = 1.
We prove that V satisfies the condition (B). Let ϕ ∈ F m be any ∆ 0 sentence. If ϕ is true, then ϕ is provable in T by ∆ 0 C G for Prov T (x). Thus ϕ ∈ T ′ and hence V (ϕ) = 1. If ϕ is false, then ¬ϕ is a true ∆ 0 sentence and is provable in T . By the consistency of T ′ , ϕ / ∈ T ′ . Therefore V (ϕ) = 0. Also since T ′ is an extension of T , V is a model of P T,m . We conclude that Sat(m) holds.
Proof of Theorem 4.1
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 4.1. For each formula ϕ, we define the formula −ϕ as follows:
We define a primitive recursive function e(ϕ, V, n) as follows:
• If V is not a (code of) truth assignment on F n , e(ϕ, V, n) = 0.
• If V is a truth assignment on F n , then the value of e(ϕ, V, n) is defined as follows by the recursion on the construction of ϕ:
1. If ϕ is an atomic formula or a universal formula,
otherwise.
2. If ϕ is ¬ξ 0 , then e(ϕ, V, n) := 1 − e(ξ 0 , V, n).
3. If ϕ is ξ 0 ∧ ξ 1 , then e(ϕ, V, n) := e(ξ 0 , V, n) · e(ξ 1 , V, n).
Then it can be proved that if V is a truth assignment on F n , then for any formula ϕ ∈ F n , V (ϕ) = e(ϕ, V, n).
Here we state Theorem 4.1 again. 
We define a PA-provably recursive function g 1 (x) in stages. Let Prf 1 (x, y) be the ∆ 1 (PA) formula x = g 1 (y) ∧ Fml(x), where Fml(x) is a natural ∆ 1 (PA) formula saying that x is a formula. Let Pr R 1 (x) be the Rosser provability predicate of Prf 1 (x, y). The definition of g 1 consists of Procedures 1 and 2. The definition of g 1 begins with Procedure 1, and enumerates theorems of T until appearing a number m such that Sat(m) does not hold. After appearing such a number m, the definition of g 1 shifts to Procedure 2. In Procedure 2, g 1 outputs all formulas in stages. In the definition of the function g 1 , we identify each formula with its Gödel number. Procedure 1. Stage 1.m:
• If Sat(m), then m) holds, 0 m is not a proof of any formula in T.
Go to Stage 1.(m + 1).
• If ¬Sat(m), then go to Procedure 2.
Procedure 2. Let m be the least number such that Sat(m) does not hold. Since Sat(m − 1) holds, there exists a model of P T,m−1 satisfying the condition (B). Let V be the least such model. Let n = d(P T,m−1 ), then V is defined on F n .
Let {ξ k } k∈ω be the effective enumeration of all formulas introduced in Section 2. Then we define the value g 1 (m + k) for k ≥ 0 as follows:
The definition of the function g 1 is completed. First, we show that the formula Prf 1 (x, y) is a proof predicate of T . Since ∀uSat(u) is true in the standard model N by Lemma 4.6, N |= Proof T ( ϕ , n) ↔ Prf 1 ( ϕ , n) for all ϕ and n by the definition of g 1 . Also PA ⊢ ∀x∀x ′ ∀y(Prf 1 (x, y)∧ Prf 1 (x ′ , y) → x = x ′ ) trivially holds. We show that the sentence ∀x(Prov T (x) ↔ ∃yPrf 1 (x, y)) is provable in PA. By the definition of g 1 , this sentence is obviously proved in PA + ∀uSat(u). It suffices to show that this sentence is provable in PA + ∃u¬Sat(u).
We proceed in PA + ∃u¬Sat(u): Let m be the least number such that Sat(m) does not hold, and let n = d(P T,m−1 ). Let V be the least model of P T,m−1 satisfying (B). We show that for any k, g 1 eventually outputs the formula ξ k . We distinguish the following three cases.
• e(ξ k , V, n) = 1 and ξ k is not of the form ¬ψ: Then g 1 (m + k) = −ξ k = ξ k .
• e(ξ k , V, n) = 1 and ξ k is of the form ¬ξ l : Then e(ξ l , V, n) = 0 and g 1 (m + l) = ¬ξ l = ξ k .
• e(ξ k , V, n) = 0: Then for p with ¬ξ k = ξ p , e(ξ p , V, n) = 1 and hence g 1 (m + p) = −ξ p = ξ k .
We have shown that ∃yPrf 1 (x, y) holds if and only if x is a formula. Since ¬Con T holds by Lemma 4.6, x is provable in T if and only if x is a formula. Therefore ∀x(Prov T (x) ↔ ∃yPrf 1 (x, y)) holds. Next, we show that our formula Pr R 1 (x) satisfies the required conditions. The following claim is a key property of our construction of Pr R 1 (x). Claim 1. The following sentence is provable in PA: "Let m is the least number such that Sat(m) does not hold, let n = d(P T,m−1 ) and let V be the least model of P T,m−1 satisfying (B). Then for any formula ϕ, e(ϕ, V, n) = 1 if and only if Pr R 1 ( ϕ ) holds".
Proof. We proceed in PA. Let m, n and V be as indicated in the statement. Let ϕ be any formula. (⇒): Suppose e(ϕ, V, n) = 1. If ¬ϕ ∈ F n , then V (¬ϕ) = 1 − V (ϕ) = 1 − e(ϕ, V, n) = 0. Therefore ¬ϕ is not in P T,m−1 because V is a model of P T,m−1 . If ¬ϕ / ∈ F n , then ¬ϕ is not in P T,m−1 because n = d(P T,m−1 ). In either case, ¬ϕ is not in P T,m−1 . Hence ¬ϕ is not in {g 1 (0), . . . , g 1 (m − 1)} because the construction of g 1 executes Procedure 1 before Stage 1.m.
Let ϕ = ξ k . Then ¬ϕ is not in {g 1 (m), . . . , g 1 (m + k)} because ¬ϕ is neither −ξ k ′ nor ¬ξ k ′ for all k ′ < k. If ϕ is not of the form ¬ψ, then g 1 (m+k) = −ϕ = ϕ because e(ξ k , V, n) = 1. If ϕ is of the form ¬ξ l , then l < k and g 1 (m + l) = ¬ξ l = ϕ because e(ξ l , V, n) = 0. Therefore Pr R 1 ( ϕ ) holds in either case. (⇐): Suppose e(ϕ, V, n) = 0. Then ϕ / ∈ {g 1 (0), . . . , g 1 (m − 1)} because n = d(P T,m−1 ) and V is a model of P T,m−1 . Let ϕ = ξ k , then g 1 (m+k) = ¬ξ k = ¬ϕ. If ϕ is not of the form ¬ψ, then ϕ / ∈ {g 1 (m), . . . , g 1 (m + k − 1)} because ϕ is neither −ξ k ′ nor ¬ξ k ′ for all k ′ < k. If ϕ is of the form ¬ξ l for some l < k, then ϕ is neither −ξ l ′ nor ¬ξ l ′ for all l ′ < l. Since e(ξ l , V, n) = 1 − e(ϕ, V, n) = 1, g 1 (m + l) = ξ l = ϕ. Hence we have ϕ / ∈ {g 1 (m), . . . , g 1 (m + k − 1)}. In either case, Pr R 1 ( ϕ ) does not hold.
). We proceed in PA + ∃u¬Sat(u): Let n and V be as above. Let ϕ and ψ be any formulas with Pr R 1 ( ϕ → ψ ) and Pr R 1 ( ϕ ) hold. Then e(ϕ → ψ, V, n) = e(ϕ, V, n) = 1 by Claim 1. We have e(ψ, V, n) = 1 and hence Pr R 1 ( ψ ) holds by Claim 1 again. We have shown that the theory PA + ∃u¬Sat(u) also proves
As in the proof of Claim 2, ∆ 0 C G for Prov T (x) implies PA + ∀uSat(u) ⊢ ∀x(True ∆0 (x) → Pr R 1 (x)). We work in PA + ∃u¬Sat(u): Let n and V be as above. First, we prove by induction on the construction of ϕ ∈ ∆ 0 that for all ∆ 0 sentences ϕ, ϕ is true if and only if e(ϕ, V, n) = 1.
• (Base Case): ϕ is an atomic sentence or a universal sentence:
(⇒): Suppose that ϕ is true. If ϕ / ∈ F n , then e(ϕ, V, n) = 1 by the definition of e. If ϕ ∈ F n , then V (ϕ) = 1 by the condition (B). Hence e(ϕ, V, n) = 1.
The proof for (⇐) is similar.
• Induction cases are straightforward by the definition of e.
Let ϕ be any true ∆ 0 sentence. Then e(ϕ, V, n) = 1 as shown above. By Claim 1, Pr R 1 ( ϕ ) holds. We have shown PA + ∃u¬Sat(u) ⊢ ∀x(True ∆0 (x) → Pr R 1 (x)).
Claim 4. PA ⊢ ∀x(Pr R 1 (x) → ¬Pr R 1 (¬x)). Proof. Since Con T is equivalent to ∀x(Pr T (x) → ¬Pr T (¬x)), PA + ∀uSat(u) ⊢ ∀x(Pr R 1 (x) → ¬Pr R 1 (¬x)) by Lemma 4.6. We reason in PA + ∃u¬Sat(u): Let n and V be as above. Suppose Pr R 1 ( ϕ ) holds for a formula ϕ. Then e(ϕ, V, n) = 1 by Claim 1. Since e(¬ϕ, V, n) = 1 − e(ϕ, V, n) = 0, Pr R 1 ( ¬ϕ ) does not hold by Claim 1 again.
2. and if ¬ϕ ∈ F n and ¬ϕ is critical, then Pr R 2 ( ϕ ) does not hold".
Proof. We procced in PA. Let m, n and V be as indicated in the statement. Let ϕ be any formula. Then for some k, ϕ is ξ k . 1. Suppose ξ k is critical. First, we prove that ¬ξ k is not in {g 2 (0), . . . , g 2 (m− 1)}. If ξ k ∈ F n , then V (ξ k ) = 1, and thus ¬ξ k is not in P T,m−1 because V is a model of P T,m−1 . If ξ k / ∈ F n , then ¬ξ k / ∈ P T,m−1 because n = d(P T,m−1 ). In either case, ¬ξ k / ∈ P T,m−1 . Therefore ¬ξ k / ∈ {g 2 (0), . . . , g 2 (m − 1)}. By the definition of g 2 , ¬ξ k is also not in {g 2 (m), . . . , g 2 (m + i k )}. Since ξ k is critical,
Suppose ¬ξ k ∈ F n and ¬ξ k is critical. Then V (¬ξ k ) = 1. Thus ξ k ∈ F n and V (ξ k ) = 0. It follows that ξ k is not critical. Also ξ k is in
Proof. Let ϕ( x) be any formula. As in our proof of Theorem 4.1, it suffices to show that the sentence is provable in PA + ∃u¬Sat(u). We reason in PA + ∃u¬Sat(u). Let n and V be as above. Notice that n is larger than the Gödel numbers of the formula ¬∀ xϕ( x). Suppose Pr R 2 ( ∀ xϕ( x) ) holds. Since ¬∀ xϕ( x) ∈ F n , ¬∀ xϕ( x) is not critical by Claim 1. Then V (¬∀ xϕ( x)) = 1, and hence V (∀ xϕ( x)) = 1. Let ϕ( a) be any instance of ∀ xϕ( x). If ϕ( a) ∈ F n , then V (ϕ( a)) = 1 by the condition (A). Thus ϕ( a) is critical. If ϕ( a) / ∈ F n , then ϕ( a) is also critical because V (∀ xϕ( x)) = 1. In either case, ϕ( a) is critical. Then Pr R 2 ( ϕ( a) ) holds by Claim 1.
) for any formulas ϕ and ψ.
Proof. Let ϕ and ψ be any formulas. We work in PA + ∃u¬Sat(u). Let n and V be as above. Notice that n is larger than the Gödel numbers of the formulas ¬ϕ and ¬(ϕ → ψ). Suppose Pr R 2 ( ϕ → ψ ) and Pr R 2 ( ϕ ) hold. Since ¬(ϕ → ψ) and ¬ϕ are in F n , these sentences are not critical by Claim 1. Then V (¬(ϕ → ψ)) = 1 and V (¬ϕ) = 1. Thus V (ϕ → ψ) = V (ϕ) = 1. Hence V (ψ) = 1 and ψ is critical. Therefore Pr R 2 ( ψ ) holds by Claim 1.
Claim 4. PA ⊢ ∀x(True ∆0 (x) → Pr R 2 (x)).
Proof. We proceed in PA + ∃u¬Sat(u). Let n and V be as above. Let ϕ be any true ∆ 0 sentence. If ϕ ∈ F n , then V (ϕ) = 1 by the condition (B). Thus ϕ is critical. If ϕ / ∈ F n , then ϕ is critical because ϕ is a true ∆ 0 sentence. In either case, ϕ is critical. Therefore we have Pr R 2 ( ϕ ) by Claim 1.
Proof. We work in PA: First, suppose that the bell never rings. Then T is consistent by Claim 2. Assume that Pr R 3 ( ϕ ) holds. Since Pr R 3 ( ϕ ) is a Σ 1 sentence, Pr R 3 ( ϕ ) is provable in T , and hence Pr R 3 ( ϕ ) ∈ P T,m for some m. By the consistency of T , we have ¬Pr R 3 ( ϕ ) / ∈ P T,m . Therefore Pr R 3 ( Pr R 3 ( ϕ ) ) holds by the definition of g 3 . We have proved that ¬"the bell rings" implies ∀x(Pr R 3 (x) → Pr R 3 ( Pr R 3 (ẋ) )). Secondly, we assume that the bell rings at Stage 1.m. Suppose ¬Pr R 3 ( Pr R 3 ( ϕ ) ) holds. By Claim 1, ¬Pr R 3 ( ϕ ) ∈ X m−1 . If ¬ϕ / ∈ X m−1 , then the bell rings before Stage 1.m. This is a contradiction. Thus ¬ϕ ∈ X m−1 . By Claim 1 again, ¬Pr R 3 ( ϕ ) holds. We have proved that ∀x(Pr R 3 (x) → Pr R 3 ( Pr R 3 (ẋ) )) is also implied by the assumption "the bell rings". Thus we conclude that ∀x(Pr R 3 (x) → Pr R 3 ( Pr R 3 (ẋ) )) holds.
Claim 5. PA ⊢ Pr R 3 ( ∀ xϕ( x) ) → ∀ xPr R 3 ( ϕ( ẋ) ) for any formula ϕ( x).
Proof. We reason in PA: As in our proof of Claim 4, it suffices to prove the sentence under the assumption "the bell rings". We assume that the bell rings at Stage 1.m. Suppose ¬Pr R 3 ( ϕ( a) ) for some a. Then by Claim 1, ¬ϕ( a) ∈ X m−1 , and hence ¬ϕ( a) ∈ X m−1,n for some n ≤ |F m−1 | by Lemma 4.3. Since ϕ( a) is an instance of ∀ xϕ( x) and ¬∀ xϕ( x) ∈ F m−1 , we have ¬∀ xϕ( x) ∈ X m−1,n+1 ⊆ X m−1 . Therefore ¬Pr R 3 ( ∀ xϕ( x) ) holds by Claim 1 again. Claim 6. If T ⊢ ϕ → ψ, then PA ⊢ Pr R 3 ( ϕ ) → Pr R 3 ( ψ ) for any formulas ϕ and ψ.
Proof. Suppose T ⊢ ϕ → ψ. Then T ⊢ ¬ψ → ¬ϕ. It suffices to show that the sentence Pr R 3 ( ϕ ) → Pr R 3 ( ψ ) is provable in PA+"the bell rings". We reason in PA+"the bell rings": Suppose that the bell rings at Stage 1.m and that ¬Pr R 3 ( ψ ) holds. Then by Claim 1, ¬ψ ∈ X m−1 . Thus ¬ψ ∈ X m−1,n for some n ≤ |F m−1 | by Lemma 4.3. Let k be the least proof of ¬ψ → ¬ϕ in T . Then k ≤ m − 1 (because k is standard) and hence ¬ψ → ¬ϕ ∈ P T,m−1 . We obtain ¬ϕ ∈ X m−1,n+1 ⊆ X m−1 . Therefore ¬Pr R 3 ( ϕ ) holds by Claim 1.
Claim 7. PA ⊢ ∀x(True ∆0 (x) → Pr R 3 (x)).
Proof. We proceed in PA+ "the bell rings": Assume that the bell rings at Stage 1.m. Let ϕ be any true ∆ 0 sentence. If ¬ϕ ∈ X m−1 , then the bell rings before Stage 1.m. Thus ¬ϕ / ∈ X m−1 . By Claim 1, ¬Pr R 3 ( ϕ ) does not hold. This means Pr R 3 ( ϕ ) holds. Our proof of Theorem 4.3 is completed.
